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THE ANTITRUST COMMISSION AND THE WEBB-
POMERENE ACT: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT
JOHN F. McDERmm*
The primary objective of the National Commission for the Review of
Antitrust Laws and Procedures (NCRALP or Commission) was to study
and make recommendations regarding the procedural and substantive
rules of law to expedite and improve complex antitrust litigation.' The
Commission's secondary task was to determine the need for retaining the
various exemptions and immunities from the antitrust laws which inhibit
free competition.2 Of course, in light of NCRALP's extremely brief six
month time limitation for making findings and recommendations3 and
equally limited resources, the Commission was unable to evaluate each of
the many existing exemptions and immunities.4 However, the Commis-
sion's review list included an analysis of the Export Trade Act of 1918,1
more commonly known as the Webb-Pomerene Act, along with such major
antitrust exemptions as insurance,6 agriculture,' and ocean shipping.' The
relatively obscure, and rarely judicially tested, Webb-Pomerene Act grants
qualifying export associations a limited immunity from antitrust prosecu-
tion.' That the Webb-Pomerene Act warranted NCRALP review was less
a statement on the actual impact of the Act on competition, consumers or
foreign trade, as a comment on the controversy it has generated from
Congress,'" the government's antitrust enforcers," and the academic 2 and
* Government Relations Counsellor, Asst. Gen. Counsel, International Business-
Government Counsellors, Inc., Washington, D.C.
I Exec. Order No. 12022, § 2(a)(1), 3 C.F.R. 155 (1977).
2 Id. at § 2(a)(2).
3 Id. at § 2(b).
Those exemptions not examined by the Commission include: 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976), 29
U.S.C. §§ 52, 101-13 (1970) (labor); 46 U.S.C. § 885 (1976) (marine insurance); 15 U.S.C. §
636 (1976) (small business joint ventures); and 42 U.S.C. § 6272 (1976) (defense prepared-
ness).
15 U.S.C. §§ 61-66 (1976).
£ 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1976).
7 U.S.C. §§ 291, 292, 601-24 (1976).
O 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1976).
See text accompanying notes 35-45 infra.
" On numerous occasions there have been attempts to repeal or expand the Act. See,
e.g., H.R. 4493, 78th Cong., 2nd Sess., 90 CONG. Rc. 3157 (1944) (urging repeal of the Act);
S. 1483, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. Rlc. 11184, 11197-99 (1973) and S. 1774, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess., 119 CONG. REc. 14891, 14920-23 (1973) (defining "export trade" to include services
and other major changes to strengthen the Act).
" See 875 ANTrRusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) AA-3 (supporting repeal of the Webb-
Pomerene Act); Letter from Miles W. Kirkpatrick, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm., to 0. V.
Stovall, Director, Int'l Div., General Accounting Office (Sept. 19, 1972) (supporting retention
of the Webb-Pomerene Act).
,2 See, e.g., Allison, Antitrust and Foreign Trade: Exemption for Export Associations,
11 Hous. L. REv. 1124 (1974); Chapman, Exports and Antitrust: Must Competition Stop at
the Water's Edge?, 6 VmD. J. TRANs. L. 399 (1973); Diamond, The Webb-Pomerene Act and
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business 3 communities.
For proponents of the Act, the Commission's decision to review and
make recommendations on the export exemptions must have been greeted
with somewhat modified rapture, for the prospect of receiving an impartial
and adequate Commission examination was particularly dim." Prior to
any analysis by the Commission and prior to the receipt of comments from
interested persons: (1) it was clear that the Webb-Pomerene Act was ac-
corded the lowest priority in terms of resource commitment; 5 (2) there
was no mandate to examine present day conditions in foreign trade, and
therefore an examination of the multiple cooperate actions aside from
export cartels was absent;"6 (3) the Act was to be given an allegedly
"independent" review by antitrust experts rather than by those interna-
tional trade experts who are knowledgeable and concerned about this coun-
try's deteriorating trade account; and (4) the Chairman of the Commission
had been an outspoken critic of the Act and had urged its repeal. 7
Midway through the Commission's review, however, a glimmer of hope
appeared for supporters of the Act. In late September of 1978, President
Carter issued a major statement on export trade policy."8 The primary
thrust of this statement involved creating a favorable environment to en-
courage American businesses to increase export trade and thereby contrib-
ute to the reduction of this country's trade deficit. 9 Perhaps sensing the
Export Trade Associations, 44 COLUM. L. REV. 805 (1947); Note, Appraisal of the Webb-
Pomerene Act, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 341 (1969).
" See, e.g., NATIONAL ASSN. OF MFRS. (NAM), THE INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATION OF U.S.
ANTITRUST LAWS: AN IssuE ANALYsIS OF GLOBAL ECONOMIC REALITY (1976); Prepared Statement
of the NAM before the National Comm. for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Proc.
(NCRALP) (Nov. 17, 1978) [hereinafter cited as NAM Statement].
" Of the 22 members appointed to the Commission, only Senator Jacob K. Javits was
versed in and concerned with the application of this country's antitrust laws to foreign
commerce. As noted earlier, the Chairman of the Commission, Mr. John Shenefield, is an
outspoken critic of the Act. See note 13 supra.
" An indication of the low priority accorded the Webb-Pomerene Act by NCRALP is
found in the Commission's Preliminary Organization Chart, which categorized the Act under
the heading "Other Antitrust Exemptions" and listed no staff person assigned to the review.
See NCRALP, COMMISSION BRIEFING BOOK (June 13, 1978).
11 See NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAws AND PRocEruRFs, REPORT
TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (Jan. 22, 1979) [hereinafter cited as
COMMISSION REPORT], reprinted in 897 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.).
The Commission Report sets forth several basic questions which NCRALP adopted to deter-
mine whether a particular exemption or immunity should be retained. Id. at 188, 897
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 55. Conspicuously missing is the
issue of whether present day economic conditions warrant the exemption. The lack of any
analysis relevant to this question severely undermines the usefulness of the Commission's
discussion of the Webb-Pomerene Act.
" See note 11 supra.
" Statement by President Carter at White House Briefing, (Sept. 26, 1978), reported in
DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIvES (BNA) (Sept. 26, 1978) at B-2.
"1 The President stated:
There are instances in which joint ventures and other kinds of cooperative arrange-
ments between American firms are necessary or desirable to improve our export
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direction that NCRALP eventually would take, and undoubtedly influ-
enced by Senator Javits's" and the Department of Commerce's21 urgings,
President Carter appointed the Business Advisory Panel in late October,
1978.22 The Panel was composed primarily of businessmen and was re-
quested to make recommendations on the export exemption to NCRALP.2
The Panel met twice and submitted a summary of conclusions to the
Commission in early December, 1978. On January 18, 1979, NCRALP
issued the final Report to the President and the Attorney General.
A reading of the Commission's Report clearly indicates that, in the
absence of the Business Advisory Panel's affirmative findings, NCRALP
would have recommended repeal of the Webb-Pomerene Act. Working in
the shadow of the Panel's recommendations, as well as the President's
export promotion statement, however, the Commission essentially was
forced into making significantly diluted recommendations. The Commis-
sion recommended that Congress initially conduct a more careful review
of the export exemption.Y If Congress subsequently determined to retain
the Act, the Commission recommended that the exemption be conditioned
on a showing of need by the Webb Associations.2 In addition, the Commis-
sion recommended that Congress expand the exclusion to cover service
industries.26 The Commission intended the report's accompanying narra-
tive discussion to form the basis for these recommendations. However, the
report's overall tenor, unsupported conclusions, and self-serving references
extracted from the information received by the Commission resulted in a
less than objective view of the Webb-Pomerene Act. Although never refer-
performance. The Justice Department has advised that most such foreign joint
ventures would not violate our antitrust laws, and in many instances would actually
strengthen competition.
Id. at B-3.
" See Letter from Senator Jacob K. Javits to Mr. John Shenefield (Aug. 25, 1978).
21 Indications are that the Commerce Department exerted considerable pressure on the
White House to establish a panel for the following three reasons: (1) the Antitrust Commis-
sion's evident bias against the Act would lead to a recommendation for its repeal, (2) it was
disappointed that the President's export message failed to address the need for the export
exemption and (3) the Chairman of the Antitrust Commission, Mr. Shenefield, believed that
the Commission should devote little time to considering the exemption. See 886 ANTITRUST
& TmDn REG. REP. (BNA) A-13 (Oct. 20, 1978).
" See Press Release of NCRALP, (Oct. 27, 1978).
"3 Id. See also 886 ANTIrRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-13 (1978).
'A COMMISSION REPoRT, supra note 16, at 295, 897 ANTIrRusT & TRADE RaG. REP. (BNA)
(Special Supp.) at 85. The Report contained the following recommendations concerning the
Webb-Pomerene Act:
The Webb-Pomerene exemption should be reexamined by the Congress. If it is
retained, it should be amended in at least two ways:
1. The antitrust immunity for export associations should be made
contingent on a showing of particularized need.
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enced, the Commission's discussion clearly was based predominantly upon
a staff options paper, which was submitted prior to the vast majority of
material from interested persons.
The Commission Report began by noting the origins of the Webb-
Pomerene Act. In 1914, Congress directed the newly formed Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) to study the conditions affecting U.S. export trade.?
A year later the FTC published an extensive two-volume report which
explained that the low level of American export trade was due primarily
to the difficulties U.S. firms were experiencing in their efforts to compete
against foreign businesses. 28 The FTC report deplored the presence of large
cartelized foreign buyers and sellers and the existence of "more effective
[foreign] organizations" which placed American exporting firms at a sig-
nificant competitive disadvantage. 2 The FTC's study further noted that
the threat of Sherman Act prosecutions deterred exporters from carrying
out collective efforts to challenge such cartels and large commercial enti-
ties."0 As a result, the FTC suggested that Congress pass legislation to
remove this impediment. In response, Congress enacted the Webb-
Pomerene Act,2 ' which provides a limited exception from both the Sher-
man and Clayton Acts to qualified joint ventures in export trade, desig-
nated Webb-Pomerene Associations (Webb Associations).
The fundamental purpose of the Webb-Pomerene Act was to permit
American exporters, particularly smaller firms, to develop "countervailing
power" to compete on an equal basis in international markets. Congress
recognized that providing a limited antitrust exemption would enhance the
competitive positions of American exporters and accomplish three objec-
tives. First, the exemption would stimulate export trade and thereby re-
duce the country's significant trade deficit.2 Second, the Act would allow
exporters to achieve greater efficiencies through joint marketing and would
offset some of the costs incurred by individual exporters entering foreign
trade.? Accordingly, American exporters could compete more effectively
against integrated foreign cartels and large enterprises. Third, Congress
intended to permit certain exporters to increase their prices abroad,
thereby gaining profits which could not be attained without the exemp-
tion. 4 Therefore, to provide some limited certainty regarding the applica-
11 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 16, at 295, 897 ANTrRUS & TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA) (Special Supp,) at 85-86 (citing the Federal Trade Commission Act, § 6(h), 15 U.S.C.
§ 46(h) (1976)).
21 1 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, REPORT ON COOPERATION IN AMERICAN EXPORT TRADE 370-
81 (1916) [hereinafter cited as FTC ExPoRT REPORT]; see COMMISSION REPORT, supra note
16, at 295, 897 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 85-86.
29 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 16, at 295, 897 ANTrrRUST & TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA) (Special Supp.) at 86.
3' See id.; see also Simmons, Webb-Pomerene Act and Antitrust Policy, 1963 Wis. L.
Rv. 426.
31 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-66 (1976).
32 See 1 FTC EXPORT REPORT, supra note 28, at 4, 199-200 (1916).
3 See id.; see also 53 CONG. REc. 13537 (1916) (remarks of Congressman Webb).
u See 55 CONG. REc. 2787 (1917); see also United States v. Concentrated Phosphate
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tion of the antitrust laws to such export associitions, Congress enacted the
Webb-Pomerene exclusion."
To qualify for the Webb-Pomerene antitrust exemption, an association
must be formed for the sole purpose of export trade and must be actively
engaged solely in such trade. The Act restrictively defines "export trade"
to include only "trade or commerce in goods, wares or merchandise ex-
ported, or in the course of being exported from the United States. . .. "I'
Therefore, the Webb-Pomerene exemption does not extend to exports of
services."8 In addition, the Act sets forth three situations in which export
associations are not protected by the exemption. First, if an association
actually restrains trade within the United States or any of its territories,
the group may be subject to antitrust action. 9 Second, the terms of the
exemption prohibit conduct which is "in restraint of the export trade of
any domestic competitor" of an association." Finally, an association may
not engage in any action which artificially affects prices within the United
States "of commodities of the class exported by such association, or which
substantially lessens competition within the United States or otherwise
restrains trade therein.""
The Webb-Pomerene Act requires every association engaged solely in
export trade to file a statement within 30 days of its creation as well as
annual statements detailing the association's conduct and business during
the preceding year.42 Administration of the Act is shared by the FTC and
the Justice Department, with primary responsibility in the former. Al-
though no mention is made in the Commission's Report, under section 5
the FTC can conduct investigations and make recommendations if miscon-
duct is found.43 Accordingly, if the FTC suspects that an association is
violating the Act's provisions, it can conduct an investigation "for the re-
adjustment of [the association's] business, in order that it may thereafter
Export Ass'n, 393 U.S. 199, 206 (1968).
-" See 1 FTC EXPORT REPORT, supra note 28, at 198-200 (1916). One sponsor of the export
exemption stated: "[Flor many years the manufacturers of this country have felt the need
of passage of this bill in order to clarify their rights in the foreign export trade." 55 CONG.
Rc. 2785 (1917) (remarks of Senator Pomerene).
1, 15 U.S.C. § 62 (1976).
37 15 U.S.C. § 61 (1976).
33 Observers frequently argue that, if the Act is retained, Congress should expand the
exemption to include services. See COMMIssIoN REPORT, supra note 16, at 301, 897 ANTrrRUST
& TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 88; Letter from Frank A. Weil, Ass't. Sec. for
Indus. and Trade, Dept. of Commerce, to the NCRALP (Nov. 20, 1978); Prepared Statement
of the NAM Before the NCRALP (Nov. 17, 1978); Testimony of Luther H. Hodges, Jr., Under
Sec. of Commerce before the Subcommittee on Int'l Finance of the Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (Sept. 17, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Hodges Testi-
mony].
1, 15 U.S.C. § 62 (1976).
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 15 U.S.C. § 65 (1976).
43 Id.
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maintain its organization and management and conduct its business in
accordance with law."'" Since 1945, when the Justice Department was
given judicial approval to carry out its investigations without waiting for
an FTC "readjustment proceeding," the section 5 procedure rarely has
been followed."
As recognized in the Commission Report, only two major court deci-
sions interpret the scope of the Webb-Pomerene Act. In United States v.
United States Alkali Export Association," the first judicial interpretation
of the Act, the district court held that a Webb Association violated the
Sherman Act by: (1) participating in foreign cartels;" (2) engaging in
practices which result in "the use of monopoly power to extinguish the
competition of independent domestic competitors engaged in the export
trade;"" and (3) carrying out practices which stabilize domestic prices by
removing surplus products from the domestic market." In the second
major decision, United States v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing
Co.,5" the court held that an export association could not establish or
operate jointly-owned production facilities abroad. 1 Significantly, the
court affirmed the legality of a Webb Association, representing certain
members of a highly oligopolistic industry, refusing to handle the products
of the remaining competing American firms.2
As mentioned in the NCRALP Report, the Minnesota Mining decision
stands on its own for providing illustrative examples of conduct that Webb
Associations may lawfully carry out. Thus, business firms can
(1) create an association by a majority of American manufactur-
ers;
(2) use the association as the members' exclusive foreign outlet;
(3) agree that goods will be purchased only from member produ-
cers;
(4) fix resale prices for the association's foreign distributors; and
(5) fix prices and establish quotas for members."
In a background discussion of the Webb-Pomerene Act, the Commis-
sion Report cites the "Silver Letter," a controversial 1924 FTC advisory
opinion. 4 The opinion represents the first administrative ruling by the
44 Id.
"5 See United States v. United States Alkali Export Ass'n, 58 F. Supp. 785, 787 (S.D.N.Y.
1944), affl'd, 325 U.S. 196 (1945). According to counsel representing several Webb Associa-
tions, no "readjustment hearings have been conducted by the FTC in the last thirty years."
See Prepared Statement of Marcus Hollabaugh Before the NCRALP, at 35 (Nov. 29, 1978).
, 58 F. Supp. at 787.
' Id. at 786.
I Id.
I' d.
50 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950).
" Id. at 963.
5 Id. at 965.
53 Id.
14 Letter from Vernon W. Van Fleet, Chairman, Federal Trade Comm'n, to C. F. Kelly,
[Vol. XXXVII
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FTC and was issued in response to a request by several American silver
producers contemplating the formation of an export association. The
FTC concluded that the exemption permitted associations to engage in
the sole activities of fixing export prices or allocating export markets.55
The Commission ascribed great importance to this advisory opinion and
summarily concluded that:
Most associations formed after the "Silver letter" have limited
their commercial activities to fixing prices rather than performing
selling and exporting functions which are now usually handled by
the individual members. Thus, the common feature of export asso-
ciations today is not their performance or efficiency or cost-
reducing functions, but rather the pursuit of traditional cartel-
related activities. (emphasis added) 6
This bold and damaging conclusion appears almost verbatim in the staff
options paper prepared for NCRALP. This options paper, in turn, refer-
enced two dated law review articles as support for the finding."
The Commission's blind reliance on such findings is irresponsible. In
fact, the more recent empirical evidence regarding the functions of Webb
Associations totally contradicts the information reported by the Commis-
sion. The most recent FTC staff analysis of Webb Associations stated: "It
has been contended that setting prices and dividing business are the
exclusive reasons that export trade associations exist. That does not ap-
pear to be the fact. While many associations do engage in one or other of
these functions, they are often incidental to attainment of other commer-
cial objectives.""5 The FTC analysis explained that only 12 of the 30 asso-
ciations help "divide business among their members," and that the same
number of associations determine the prices of the member firms to some
extent.59 The FTC study found only one association primarily involved in
pricing, and these prices were recommended rather than binding on the
members. 5 In addition, this sole association generally reported pricing
variances of the member firms.
According to the FTC analysis, the Webb Associations perform a host
of commercial functions for their members. These activities include: (1)
Silver Producers' Committee (July 31, 1924), reprinted in FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, STAFF
REPORT, WEBB-PomIERENE ASSOCIATION: A 50-YEAR REmw (1967) (Appendix D) [hereinafter
cited as FTC 50-YEAR REvIEw].
" See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 16, at 296, 897 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA) (Special Supp.) at 86.
"Id.
' See Allison, Antitrust and Foreign Trade: Exemption for Export Associations, 11
Hous. L. REV. 1124 (1974); Larson, An Economic Analysis of the Webb-Pomerene Act, 13 J.
LAw & EcoN. 461 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Larson].
"1 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF SURVEY OF WEBB-POMERENE
ASSOCIATIONS 8 (Nov. 9, 1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978 WEB ACr SURVEY].
"Id.
60 Id. at 9.
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the establishment of sales agencies from offices in the United States; (2)
the establishment of sales agencies from foreign sales offices or through
foreign sales agents; (3) market research and analysis of export markets;
(4) sales to the United States for delivery outside this country; (5) credit
information and collection facilities; and (6) a variety of other services that
can best achieve efficiencies through joint action." The Assistant Secretary
for Industry and Trade of the Commerce Department also reinforced the
FTC's conclusions. The Assistant Secretary informed NCRALP that the
Commerce Department was unaware of any association whose sole func-
tion involved fixing a common export price for members.1
2
The Commission's assumptions regarding the conduct of Webb Asso-
ciations lead to the implicit conclusion that such associations are indeed
cartels in the purest sense of the term. Even though Congress envisioned
that Webb Associations might act as export cartels in very unusual circum-
stances," the evidence indicates that this result has not occurred in the
vast majority of cases. According to one senior government antitrust poli-
cymaker, Webb Associations have not been the effective "cartelizers" that
the NCRALP Report would have one believe. The Justice Department's
Director of Domestic and International Planning recently stated that an
"all-inclusive condemnation of [Webb Associations] ignores the fact that
many export associations lack market power and exist merely to achieve
minor economies of scale in selling abroad." 4 In addition, this policy-
maker concluded that "since there are very few products in which the
U.S. alone accounts for a dominant share of the world's export, most of
the [Webb] associations do not have the power to achieve prices higher
than the international level."65
Finally, the staff options paper which provided the basis for the Com-
mission's conclusion" in turn primarily relied on a 1970 analysis of the
Webb-Pomerene Act by Professor Larson." Distressingly, Professor Larson
made no attempt to analyze the effects Webb Associations have had on
prices in international markets. Such empirical data, of course, could de-
termine whether the associations in fact have succeeded as so-called car-
tels. Preliminarily, in view of the FTC finding and supporting evidence,
, Id. at 12.
62 Letter and attached responses from Frank A. Weil, Asst. Sec. for Dom. & Int'l Bus.,
Dept. of Commerce, to the NCRALP (Nov. 20, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Weil Responses].
0 See United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947, 963-65 (D. Mass.
1950); text accompanying notes 32-41 supra.
64 Address by Joel Davidow, Center for Interdisciplinary Research, Bielefeld, West Ger-
man (July 16, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Davidow Address].
0 Remarks of Joel Davidow, reprinted in Legal Times of Washington, June 26, 1978, at
21.
" NCRALP, STAFF REPORT ON EXPORT ASSOCIATIONS (Oct. 2, 1978) [hereinafter cited as
NCRALP STAFF REPORT].
11 Larson, supra note 57. The NCRALP staff accepted Professor Larson's sweeping con-
clusions as factual. For example, Larson concludes: "The Act is not used to combat either
foreign selling or buying cartels. It has never been so used." Id. at 479.
[Vol. XXXVII
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such a conclusion is tenuous. Nevertheless, several economists recently
made an attempt to provide an analysis of the Act's effects."9 These econo-
mists found that very few products of Webb Associations "are likely to be
successfully cartelized" and that there were few indications that members
receive substantially increased prices for their products. 9 The authors of
this study concluded, therefore, that Webb Associations have been unsuc-
cessful "cartelizers." Accordingly, the analysis concludes by recommend-
ing repeal of the Act because participating firms were not receiving ade-
quate profit returns to justify the exemption." Proponents of the export
exemption, naturally, would argue the converse: for in passing the Act,
Congress did not envision that American export cartels would mushroom
across the international trade landscape. Rather, the legislators primarily
intended Webb Association members to obtain cost savings through joint
.marketing and information exchange efforts." Nevertheless, critics of the
Webb-Pomerene Act incorrectly believe that the "success" of the export
exemption is measured by the ability of the associations to cartelize Ameri-
can export trade.7 2 The relatively small percentage of Webb Association
exports as compared to the total of American exports is not due primarily
to the fact that only a handful (if any) of American products are suscepti-
ble to successful monopoly activity in export trade. Rather, the failure of
this government'to promote Webb Associations ag successful vehicles for
achieving economies of scale through cooperative export arrangements is
responsible for the underutilization of the exemption.
The NCRALP Report discussed current employment of the exemption
by initially verifying the virtually undisputed view that the Act has failed
to meet Congress's expectations for promoting export trade." According to
the most recent FTC statistics, Webb Association exports accounted for
only 1.5 percent of total American exports, nearly one-third less than in
1962.11 An observation that the exemption has not met congressional ex-
pectations, however, is certainly a different conclusion than a statement
on the usefulness of the exemption. Current estimates show that Webb
Associations account for approximately $1.7 or $1.9 billion per year of
" Amacher, Sweeney & Tollison, A Note On The Webb-Pomerene Law And The Webb-
Cartels, 23 ANTTRuST BULL. 371 (1978).
" Id. at 372, 377.
, Id. at 377.
71 See text accompanying notes 32-35 supra.
See Statement of C. Fred Bergsten, Asst. of the Treasury for Int'l Affairs, before the
Subcom. on Int'l Finance of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
(Sept. 17, 1979). Assistant Secretary Bergsten observed that "Webb Associations have gener-
ally been successful only in two areas: motion picture and television film exports, and exports
of standardized raw materials." Id.
"CoIsnssIoN REPORT, supra note 16, at 298, 897 ANTRusT & TRADE RE. REP. (BNA)
(Special Supp.) at 86-87.
74 1978 WEBB AcT SURvay, supra note 58, at 15; see CoMMISsIoN REpoR, supra note 16,
at 299, 897 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. RaP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 87.
1980]
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American exports.75 At a time when the United States trade deficit exceeds
$25 billion per year, any contribution must be considered useful.
The Commission Report failed to note, however, why Webb Associa-
tions have not made a greater contribution towards promoting eiport
trade. One of the primary reasons is the lack of any governmental balanc-
ing between the national interests in stimulating exports and protecting
competition. As evidence of this deficiency, note that other antitrust ex-
emptions, such as those applicable to air and ocean transportation, and
agricultural cooperatives, are administered by agencies directly con-
cerned with fulfilling the purpose of the exemption.7" In contrast, the
Webb-Pomerene Act is administered by the antitrust enforcement agen-
cies. Certainly, if Congress transferred administrative authority over the
Act to the Commerce Department, and the Special Trade Representative's
office encouraged American firms to file as Webb Associations, the Act
indeed could play a meaningful role in reducing this country's trade defi-
cit.
With respect to size and characteristics of membership in Webb Asso-
ciations, NCRALP expressed considerable concern that the associations
primarily are composed of large corporations.77 In a similar vein, the Com-
mission Report cited the 1967 FTC 50-Year Review78 to show that most
successful associations deal in homogeneous products and that the mem-
bers of such groups are generally leaders of an oligopolistic industry. More
recently, however, evidence indicates that Webb Associations are typically
of moderate size, having $500,000 to $1 million in sales per year.79 Nonethe-
less, assuming arguendo that the Report is correct, the Commission failed
to discuss any explanation for this observation. The fact that many un-
standardized commodities are unsuitable for export may explain the com-
position of 'certain associations. For example, large purchasers of such
goods as textiles and television sets generally purchase by brand names
rather than by general description. Products that Webb Associations some-
times handle, such as wood pulp and sulphur, are more suitable for the
types of commercial activities carried out by the associations, such as joint
marketing. Moreover, the fact that leaders in oligopolistic industries com-
prise the membership of several successful associations probably can be
attributed to two factors. First, the nature of these industries often require
substantial economies of scale and entry barriers are too high for participa-
tion by small and medium sized firms. Second, many smaller firms may
encounter greater organizational difficulties in forming an association than
a few large firms. Additionally, small firms are less likely to risk the consid-
" See Hodges Testimony, supra note 38, at 8.
7' See id. at 17.
' COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 16, at 299, 897 ANTTRrusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA)
(Special Supp.) at 87.
78 FTC 50-YAR REVIEW, supra note 54, at 32-34, 44-45; see COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 16, at 299, 897 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 87.
1, See Hodges Testimony, supra note 38, at 12.
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erable uncertainty as to whether the limited export exemption really pro-
vides adequate antitrust protection.
The NCRALP Report highlights another principal concern about the
Webb-Pomerene Act, regarding the domestic spillover effects of the ex-
emption. This position asserts that, by permitting companies to cooperate
for export purposes, Congress invites anticompetitive restraints in domes-
tic interstate commerce."0 As succinctly stated by one author: "It is a rare
swimmer whose breathing is different depending upon whether he swims
in an ocean or a river."
81
At the outset, the spillover effects argument is believed to be inconsist-
ent with the Justice Department's alleged effort to contribute to this coun-
try's export promotion needs. In this latter context, the Department as-
serts that it will not prosecute collective export activities whose only effect
is a restraint of foreign markets, particularly such export restraints as price
fixing and market allocation, which do not exclude others from exporting."
However, in the context of Webb-Pomerene Act discussions such as the
NCRALP Report, critics argue that such export transactions should not
be permitted because they "invariably" invite anticompetitive conduct in
U.S. commerce. The Antitrust Division has relied heavily on the spillover
effects argument as a basis for urging repeal of the Act. As far back as 1967,
the Assistant Attorney General then heading the Antitrust Division stated
before a Senate Antitrust Subcommittee:
[T]he existence of an antitrust exemption for export associa-
tions inevitably affects competition at home (and thereby affects
the American consumer). Every export agreement that offsets the
amount of a product sold abroad must inevitably affect the
amount sold at home. And to the extent that the agreements allow
exporters to control prices abroad it is likely to misallocate re-
sources at home. (emphasis added)"
Although the NCRALP staff options paper cites two major studies
which might dilute the frequently accepted domestic spillover criticism of
the Act,u the Commission Report failed to include these studies. Neverthe-
0
See CoMMISsIoN REPORT, supra note 16, at 299, 897 ANTTRrUST & TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA) (Special Supp.) at 87.
,1 Metzger, Cartels, Combines, Commodity Agreements and International Law, 11 TEXAS
INT'L L.J. 527, 534 (1976). Professor Metzger notes that "[c]ountries the world over have
taken no action to prevent their nationals from restraining the trade of others through cartels
and combines." Id. at 532.
2 See J. Raht, International Cartels and Their Regulation, at 27 (Nov. 10, 1979) (Colum-
bia Univ. Conf. on Int'l Reg. of Restrictive Bus. Prac., Airline House, Va.); D. Rosenthal,
Subject Matter Jurisdiction in the U.S. Export Trade, at 3 (April 23, 1977) (71st Annual
Meeting of the Amer. Soc. of Int'l Law, San Francisco, Cal.).
0 Testimony of Donald F. Turner, International Aspects of Antitrust 1967: Hearing
Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 124 (1967), cited in, 312 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. RP. (BNA)
A-19 (July 4, 1967).
8 NCRALP STAFF REPOirr, supra note 66, at 23, 29.
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less, three basic responses to this criticism exist. First, as indicated in the
Act's legislative history, Congress was keenly aware of the possibility that
the exemption might adversely affect interstate commerce.u Congress in-
tended to remedy this possibility, however, by empowering the FTC to
conduct a section 5 readjustment hearing whenever the association's mem-
bers were restraining domestic trade or otherwise misusing the Act.8" If
necessary, the Justice Department could also bring suit in federal dis-
trict court to remedy the abuse. 8 As stated in the Attorney General's 1955
Antitrust Commission Report, "abuses of the Act could be readily dealt
with by either the Federal Trade Commission or the Justice Depart-
ment."88 This opinion was reinforced more recently by a General Account-
ing Office Report on the Webb-Pomerene Act. 9
Second, by enacting the Webb-Pomerene exemption, Congress in-
tended to effectuate a policy in the national interest and stimulate exports
even though there might exist some dangers to domestic competition.
Although the Justice Department's enforcement policies appear untar-
nished by judicial advice, the court in Minnesota Mining stated that:
"[T]he courts are required to give as ungrudging support to the policy of
the Webb-Pomerene as to the policy of the Sherman Act. Statutory eclecti-
cism is not a proper judicial function." 1
Third, Webb Association counsel, in practice, narrowly construe the
export exemption and closely monitor the methods association members
employ to carry out activities. In view of the additional policing of associa-
tion activities by both the Justice Department and the FTC, it is extremely
unlikely that Webb Associations will conspire to restrain domestic trade,
" See, e.g., 55 CONG. REc. 3573 (1917) (remarks of Rep. Morgan); 56 CONG. REc. 4723
(1917) (remarks of Rep. Volstead); 56 CONG. REC. 175 (1917) (remarks of Senator Cummins).
86 See text accompanying note 43 supra.
'T See text accompanying note 45 supra.
REPORT OF THE ATToRNEY GENERAL's NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST
LAws (1955), cited in, General Accounting Office, Clarifying Webb-Pomerene Act Needed to
Help Increase U.S. Exports 14 (Aug. 22, 1973) [hereinafter cited as GAO STUDY].
a, GAO STUDY, supra note 87, at 15. The Commission Report failed to note the GAO's
findings and conclusions, which supported proponents of the Act, despite tl~e fact that numer-
ous submissions to NCRALP referenced this study. See, e.g., Weil Responses, supra note 62,
at 12; NAM Statement, supa note 13, at 8; Letter from Robert M. Gants, Nat'l Constructors
Ass'n, to Rufus Phillips Chmn., Business Advisory Panel to NCRALP (Dec. 1, 1978)
[hereinafter cited as Gants Letter].
In response to "spillover" concerns expressed by Senator Norris, Senator Pomerene re-
sponded:
I call [Senator Norris's] attention especially to the last two paragraphs of
section 5, which confer upon the Federal Trade Commission full power over any
agreements, transactions, or acts of any of these associations in the foreign trade;
and if the Commission should find that [such agreements] are violative of the
provisions of this bill or, for that matter, of any of our antitrust laws [the FTC can
take appropriate remedial action].
55 CONG. REC. 2786 (1917); see 15 U.S.C. § 65 (1976).
11 United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947, 965 (D. Mass. 1950)..
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particularly since criminal prosecutions are more likely today than in the
past."
The NCRALP Report further details two related arguments often
raised against the Webb-Pomerene exemption. Critics of the Act contend
that the blanket nature of the exemption is too broad in scope.93 In addi-
tion, opponents argue that the exemption is unnecessary, since antitrust
law already permits certain joint ventures which are necessary to gain
entry in foreign markets." In contrast, the Commission Report includes
proponents' arguments that, by permitting joint commercial arrangements
in export trade, Webb Associations can achieve the economies of scale
needed to compete against larger foreign rivals.95 Moreover, the need for
the export exemption to eliminate antitrust uncertainties is one of the
cornerstones of support for the Act. In this regard, both the proponents'
and opponents' arguments deserve further elaboration.
The Justice Department has argued that the Webb-Pomerone exemp-
tion is not really necessary because many joint export ventures have pro-
competitive effects and, therefore, are permissible under the Sherman and
Clayton Acts.9" For example, the Antitrust Guide for International
Operations states:
Normally, the Department would not challenge a merger or joint
venture whose only effect was to reduce competition among the
parties in a foreign market, even when goods or services were being
exported from the United States. . . . [S]hort-term consortia are
useful where large risks or dollar amounts are involved . . . or
where complimentary skills are required (as with the typical con-
struction joint venture)."
11 The Webb-Pomerene exemption, therefore, is not unlike certain other antitrust ex-
emptions in this respect. For example, one other such exemption permits the world's major
oil companies to cooperate on a continuous basis to meet and carry out "Allocation Systems
Tests", which are intended to prepare the industrial nations for the possibility of another oil
embargo. See Energy Policy & Conservation Act of 1975, 41 U.S.C. § 6272 (Supp. V 1975).
Although alarming to critics of this exemption, the U.S. government antitrust personnel
charged with monitoring the oil companies' activities have determined that such joint activi-
ties have had no discernible effect on U.S. commerce and, therefore, support retention of the
exemption. See General Accounting Office, U.S. Oil Companies' Involvement in the Interna-
tional Energy Program (Oct. 21, 1977). This GAO Report quotes the FTC's Director, Bureau
of Competition as saying: "Congress, in passing the EPC Act, made the legislative determina-
tion that the benefits to be derived from oil company participation in the IEP are sufficient
to risk any anticompetitive effects." Id. at 22. Arguably, Congress intended this "balancing
test" approach to be applied to export promotion and the Webb-Pomerene exemption.
13 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 16, at 299, 897 ANrrrusr & TRADE REG. RFP. (BNA)
(Special Supp.) at 87.
"Id.
"Id. at 301, 897 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 88.
" See 875 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) AA-3; COMMISSION REPORT, supra note
16, at 299, 897 ANTrrRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 87.
"1 Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Guide For International Operations, 21
(Jan. 26, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Antitrust Guide].
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This opinion is intended to alleviate the fears of exporters, including those
involved in services (e.g., construction), who are contemplating a "one
shot" joint venture. The Guide explains that American antitrust laws
rarely are susceptible to clear and concise rules in relation to foreign com-
merce." In addition, the Justice Department qualifies their joint venture
acquiescence quoted above, stating: "Any joint venture among competitors
involves some antitrust risk that the cooperation may spill over into other
areas."9 Therefore, many exporters may be unwilling to take these "risks,"
particularly since the point at which the joint venture becomes unlawful
is extremely vague. With this type of "guidance," American exporters
understandably feel constrained by the antitrust laws, in spite of Justice
Department efforts to assuage these perceptions. Of course, even Webb
Associations are not immune to the risk of domestic spillover effects. Nev-
ertheless, if properly administered, the exemption would substantially
minimize such damages.
Furthermore, joint selling companies frequently need to operate on a
long-term basis in order to reap the benefits of significant foreign markets.
Thus, short-term joint ventures, although perhaps permissible on an ad
hoc basis by the Justice Department, are not as meaningful as the Depart-
ment would have businessmen believe. Without the Webb-Pomerene ex-
emption, one Commerce Department official indicated that:
Many companies, fearing illegality, would cease engaging in long-
term joint activities which are essential to developing profitable
foreign markets. Joint operations, that is, would be limited to sin-
gle projects. Indication that the [Act] does protect joint export
activities from potentially crippling antitrust challenges is pro-
vided by the decision in the Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing
case. . . .. Many of the activities listed in the opinion would be
curtailed or impossible without the protection of Webb-Pomerene
Act. (emphasis added).100
Courts would undoubtedly find many Webb Association practices unlaw-
ful in the absence of the export exemption. Agreements on prices and
quotas are two of the more obvious examples of antitrust violations, even
where the established price is not set at an anticompetitive level. Addition-
ally, many examples considered by the Minnesota Mining court might
constitute unlawful conduct if the Webb-Pomerene Act did not explicitly
,1 Id. The Antitrust Guide states:
The United States antitrust statutes do not provide a checklist of specific, detailed
statutory requirements, but instead set forth principles of almost constitutional
breadth. This broad mandate frequently requires private parties, prosecutors and
the courts to consider the overall purpose and effect of business arrangements in
order to evaluate them under the antitrust laws.
Id.
" Id. at 20; see text accompanying note 92 supra. See also Address by John Shenefield,
Time, Inc. Conference on Antitrust (May 7, 1979).
1' Weil Responses, supra note 62, at 7-8.
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sanction the behavior. 10 1 The prospect of a criminal enforcement proceed-
ing or a private treble damage action by a domestic competitor might deter
participation.by many association members. Therefore, supporters of the
Webb-Pomerene Act believe that the exemption at least provides a limited
degree of certainty concerning the legality of joint exporting arrangements.
Finally, the NCRALP Report mentions the critical argument that the
exemption is unnecessary because export brokers could provide many (if
not all) of the services which Congress intended Webb Associations to
fulfill. The export broker's primary interest, however, involves arranging
a sale, regardless of which manufacturer or group of manufacturers profits.
Hence, as one Commerce Department official pointed out, a producer sel-
dom can rely on the active promotion of his particular products.' Simi-
larly, a broker might not desire to continue a business promotion relation-
ship with the producer after a given sale is concluded. Moreover, the broker
is not necessarily concerned with the promotion of American exports.
Rather, the broker arranges a sale "regardless of the source of supply or
the destination of sale."' 3 In contrast, a Webb Association makes a signifi-
cant contribution to both its members and the nation "as a responsible
continuing source" of American goods.'
The NCRALP Report summarily notes that supporters of the Webb-
Pomerene Act believe that a continuing need exists to permit joint arrange-
ments for American exporters in order to offset the "economic disparity
that exists between themselves individually and monopsonistic foreign
buyers.""' 5 In response, the report contends that members of Webb Asso-
ciations seldom have cited foreign cartels as the reason for joining an
1*1 The Minnesota Mining court found that Webb Associations could lawfully exclude
competitors of the member firms. United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp.
947, 965 (D. Mass. 1950). Should the associations engage in such conduct without sufficient
business justifications, the Justice Department would likely instigate an antitrust proceeding
in the absence of the Webb-Pomerene exemption. Similarly, exclusive contracts between
Webb Associations and foreign distributors would be unlawful without an exemption. See
Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (group refusal to deal violative of
the Sherman Act); Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961) and Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949) (exclusive contracts violative of § 3 of the
Clayton Act). Such exclusive contracts, however, prevent the foreign distribution from going
to independent non-member producers or combination export managers. Therefore, the Webb
Association's market power is improved considerably. Exclusive contracts also are necessary
to maintain supplies on a consistent basis. Finally, without the Webb-Pomerene exemption,
cooperative export marketing probably either would be prohibited or sharply curtailed.
°2 Weil Responses, supra note 62, at 17-18. Moreover, in passing the Webb-Pomerene
Act, Congress believed that joint exporting would enable exporters to sell their goods more
profitably by eliminating export brokers. See 53 CONG. REc. 13701 (1916) (remarks of Rep.
Fordney).
10 Weil Responses, supra note 62, at 18.
101 Letter from Laurence N. Odence, Sulphur Export Corp., to Rufus Phillips, Chmin.,
Business Advisory Panel to the NCRALP (Nov. 30, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Odence Let-
ter].
105 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 16, at 301, 897 ANTrMusT & TRAME REG. REP. (BNA)
(Special Supp.) at 88.
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association."' As authority for this proposition, the Commission Report
cites the 1970 Larson analysis."0 7 In form, Larson based his conclusions
upon data compiled in the early 1960's and promulgated by the FTC in
1967. The NCRALP Report misses the mark by not referencing the most
recent (and therefore more germane) 1978 FTC Webb-Pomerene survey.108
This study "suggests the likelihood of a new situation" from that which
existed when the 1916 FTC Report and the 1955 Attorney General's Report
were issued." 9 Indeed, the 1978 FTC analysis lists only four instances
where private cartels compete with Webb Associations."' However, the
associations also compete against: (1) cooperative marketing groups; (2)
state trading agencies; and (3) quasi-public commercial companies. There-
fore, the 1978 FTC study concluded that "public and private marketing
power now appear to be of unusually equal competitive importance.""'
The recent FTC analysis found the proliferation of foreign government
involvement in traditionally private sector commercial affairs even more
evident when analyzing important customers of Webb Associations."' For
example, in the case of one Webb Association, state-controlled entities,
"which enjoy preferential tariffs and import quotas which discriminate
against U.S. importers," marketed approximately 70 to 75 percent of world
trade in the goods."' Further, these state entities are capable of applying
bargaining pressures "which normally would not be acceptable as business
norms within the United States, but which are countenanced and some-
times supported by their governments.""' Therefore, U.S. exporters and
Webb Associations generally find it extremely difficult to compete and sell
individually against state-trading systems."' In centrally planned produc-
tion and resource allocation, there is no necessary link between economic
lists and prices. Indeed, like cartels, state-trading organizations are given
a monopoly over the importing and exporting of goods and may control the
quantities and prices of such goods. The decisions of the state planners
promote governmental objectives and bear no relation to competitive con-
ditions."'
106 Id.
10? Id.; see Larson, supra note 57, at 486.
"' 1978 WEBB Acr SURvEY, supra note 58.
10 Id. at 13.
SId.
'" Id.
II Nine Webb Associations stated that foreign governments were their leading customers
or prospective customers. Three other associations included government agencies among their
many customers. In addition, four Webb Associations reported state trading companies as
principal customers. Finally, three associations listed foreign buying cartels as their more
important customers. Id.
III Letter from Thomas Mulvihill, Jr., Phosphate Chemicals Export Ass'n, to Rufus
Phillips, Chmn., Business Advisory Panel to the NCRALP (Nov. 22, 1978).
"' Id.
1 See Gants Letter, supra note 88; Odence Letter, supra note 102.
See generally NEUBERGER & LARA, THE FOREIGN TRADE PRACTICES OF CENTRALLY
PLANNED ECONOMIES AND THEIR EFFECTS ON U.S. INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS (1977).
WEBB-POMERENE
As a consequence, governments of centrally planned or market econom-
ies will establish a national or export cartel for policy reasons. Therefore,
it is extremely difficult for the individual American -exporter to face non-
price competition in these countries' home markets-and in third country
markets. As the ABA Antitrust Section concluded in 1954, the Webb-
Pomerene Act should be retained not only because of the existence of
foreign cartels, but because of the new international climate."7 The Anti-
trust Section concluded that "the existence of state controlled buying
agencies, state monopolies and other foreign industrial combinations
[make] it desirable that American exporters be permitted to combine
among themselves in export associations.""' 8 Arguably, a united voice in
sales negotiations, marketing and other commerciai activities is needed
particularly for those American exporters wishing to enter Eastern Euro-
pean markets. Similarly, in the potentially lucrative China market, a
united and reliable representative export entity is more likely to gain mar-
ket entry.
Neither the Commission Report nor the staff options paper discussed
the international trade aspects of foreign trading companies. American
exporters currently face competition from large integrated trading compa-
nies which have been established worldwide, particularly in Japan. These
organizations proceed on the notion that a combination operates more
efficiently than the independent constituent firms. The enormous power
and success of international trading companies is most pronounced in
Japan, where their role in export expansion may constitute the "greatest
contribution to the postwar Japanese economy.""
9
The foreign trading firms provide an impressive array of "bonuses" to
their clients. For example, the groups furnish a staggering amount and
number of credit, loans, and loan guarantees. The trading companies pro-
cure substantial low-interest loans from commercial banks and pass these
low rates on to customers. This procedure is particularly helpful to the
many small and medium sized exporting firms who are clients of the mam-
moth trading companies and who could otherwise not afford the higher
rates of direct commercial loans. Moreover, the trading companies furnish
a significant amount of marketing, technological and even legal and politi-
cal information to their customers, usually without additional charges. 2"
Such benefits enable the trading companies to achieve substantial cost
reductions for the manufacturer customers.
The final criticism of the Webb-Pomerene Act noted by the NCRALP
" Report of the ABA Comm. on Antitrust Problems in International Trade, 5 ABA
SECTION OF ANTITRUST L. 188 (1954).
SId.
" A. YOUNG, THE SoGo SHOSHA: JAPAN'S MULTINATIONAL TRADING COMPANIES 129 (1979).
In 1976, the ten largest Japanese trading companies grossed nearly $155 billion in sales,
carried out 56.4% of Japan's total exports and 55.6% of its imports. Id. at 4. These transac-
tions accounted for slightly over 5% of world trade. Id.
121 Id. at 67.
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Report is that exemption of American export cartels from the antitrust
laws severely undermines this country's credibility in advocating the adop-
tion of strong international antitrust rules.' 2' The Report infers that, be-
cause the exemption sanctions American export cartels, our trading part-
ners have retaliated by implementing their own cartels. In addition, the
Commission Report implicitly equates foreign antitrust enforcement ef-
forts with American policies. The staff options paper reflects this presump-
tion, stating: "[T]he argument that foreign producers are not constrained
by antitrust laws . . . and are therefore able to deal more effectively vis-
a-vis American firms in foreign markets is certainly no longer valid today,
if indeed it ever was.'
' 12
To argue that the Webb-Pomerene exemption, which accounts for only
1.5 percent of Ameri~an export trade, is an embarrassment to this country
or has precipitated national cartel retaliations is nothing less than naive.
If anything, this country's trading partners should be placed in a position
of justifying why American domestic producers and exporters continually
face the multiple noncompetitive conditions prevalent in foreign trade.
The retaliation argument is particularly misleading for it is based on an
isolated incident involving American sulphur exports' 23 and fails to ac-
knowledge the fact that literally hundreds of foreign cartels are established
for reasons totally unrelated to the Webb-Pomerene Act. Indeed, many
countries consider national export cartels a legitimate form of business
activity and, therefore, encourage the formation of these groups.' 24
Unlike other antitrust systems in the world, American law prohibits
any cooperative arrangements by firms which restrain export trade, even
if the restraint has no effect on domestic interstate trade.,, Most other
industrialized nations strike a balance between antitrust enforcement and
other national priorities, such as export promotion.'26 A 1974 OECD study
recommended that, at a minimum, the world's major trading nations re-
quire all export cartels to report to the relevant antitrust authorities and
that the nations adopt procedures to assure enforcement of export exemp-
121 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 16, at 300, 897 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA)
(Special Supp.) at 88.
12 NCRALP STAFF REPORT, supra note 66, at 26.
"2 In 1963, the British Restrictive Practices Court upheld the lawfulness of a British
purchasing cartel on the grounds that such a cartel was necessary to bargain with and secure
fair terms from the Webb Association. In re National Sulphuric Acid Association's Agree-
ment, L.R. 4 R.P. 169 (Rest. Prac. Ct. 1963), C.R. 6 R.P. 210 (1966), cited in FUGATE, FOREIGN
COMMERCE AND THE ANTRusT LAWS 247 (1973).
2I See Weil Responses, supra note 62, at 24-25, where he concluded that "all our major
trading partners permit, and in fact often encourage, their exporting companies to join to-
gether in national export cartels." Id.
2 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976).
126 As recently stated by Joel Davidow, Director of Domestic and International Planning
at the Justice Department, and the United States representative to the UNCTAD and OECD
Restrictive Business Practice sessions: "Other [countries] would have very little bias against
private trade restraints per se, evaluating them after the fact in terms of their effects."
Davidow Address, supra note 64.
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tions.'1 Presently, the United States stands alone in.strictly following the
OECD recommendations.
The answer to the prevelance of worldwide cartelsdoes riot lie in repeal
of the Webb-Pomerene exemption, as opponents of the Act contend. Such
a unilateral act would serve no purpose whatsoever other than to further
damage American export competitiveness. This country can ill afford such
economic sacrifices for foreign policy ends. A less extreme and more ra-
tional solution involves the United States continuing to negotiate with
other countries to eliminate export cartels and other noncompetitive de-
vices. Modification of the Webb-Pomerene Act, if necessary, should hinge
on successful negotiation of such agreements and should be conditioned on
proper monitoring of the accords.
Apparently, the conclusions of the Business Advisory Panel, had a
significant impact on the National Commission's final recommendations.
The Panel concluded that Congress should retain the Webb-Pomerene
exemption for four basic reasons. First, the Panel felt that the American
balance of trade problem had reached critical dimensions and that the Act
"probably has a desirable impact" in this area.'' Second, the Panel recog-
nized the non-competitive aspects of international. trade facing American
businesses, including unfavorable practices of certain foreign governments
and competition from foreign cartels.'"' Because the export exemption ena-
bles businesses to "share the rapidly escalating costs of bid preparation,
market analysis, financing and risk taking in the international market,"
the Panel found that the Act offset some of the competitive disadvantages
and improved the competitive positions of American firms."' Third, the
Business Advisory Panel rejected the domestic spillover argument because
the antitrust authorities have sufficient means to prohibit any adverse
domestic effects that may result from joint export arrangements."' Fourth,
the Panel found the argument that the Act inhibits the United States'
ability to negotiate various international agreements to terminate foreign
cartels unpersuasive.12 The Panel did note, however, that Congress could
amend the Act to prohibit any conduct proscribed by international agree-
ment."' Finally, after concluding that the exemption should be retained,
the Panel recommended that Congress expand the Act to include services,
since a significant percentage of export projects require provision of both
goods and services.' u
' OECD, EXPORT CARTELS, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON RFsTIUc'rm Busi-
NESS PRACTacEs 52-53 (1974).
In NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWs AND PROCEDURES, REPORT TO
Tm PREsmENT AND THE ATrOREY GENERAL, Vol. 2, 294 (Jan. 22, 1979) [hereinafter cited as
ADVISORY PANEL REPORT]
"' Id. at 293-94.
' Id. at 294.
' Id. at 296-97.
I /d.
'1 Id. at 297.
,u Id. at 298.
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The introduction to NCRALP's conclusions concerning the Webb-
Pomerene exemption makes it clear that the arguments promulgated by
supporters of the Act failed to impress the Commissioners. After essen-
tially summarizing the most pronounced criticisms of the exemption, the
Report stated: "As a result, a number of Commissioners favor outright
repeal of the Act."'' 5 However, because of the limited time available to
study the Act and "especially in light of the Business Advisory Panel's
conclusion[s]," the Commission merely recommended that Congress
reexamine the exemption.'38 If Congress subsequently concludes that the
Act should be retained, the Report strongly recommended conditioning the
exemption upon a showing of need by individual export associations. 37 The
Commission believed that a "need" requirement would reflect more accur-
ately the original purpose of the Act by permitting only those cooperative
export arrangements necessary to meet the combinations of foreign com-
petitors or customers. Thus, the Commissioners recorimended that the
"need" requirement involve a determination of whether the "associations
can provide genuine economies in the promotion and conduct of U.S. ex-
port trade or where associations are needed for the defense of legitimate
commercial interests."'38
The Business Advisory Panel considered and rejected the proposed
"need" qualification of the exemption for three reasons. First, if foreign
trade conditions were not exactly as anticipated, the exemption might be
in jeopardy.' 9 Second, it might be difficult to establish valid criteria to
determine when a particular exemption is needed. 140 Finally, trying to
impose strict limitations on the type of export activity which Webb Asso-
ciations might undertake could destroy the requisite flexibility necessary
to enter foreign markets effectively.''
In all likelihood, conditioning the Webb-Pomerene exemption on a
showing of need would have the effect of repealing the Act. Webb Associa-
tions are organized in part to provide some commercial continuity to retain
foreign contracts. Under the Commission's proposal, however, associations
would confront the nearly impossible task of predicting whether future
foreign trade conditions will continue to warrant an antitrust exemption.
Moreover, the "need" requirement as proposed by NCRALP fails to recog-
nize that Webb Associations require countervailing power to meet not only
foreign cartels, but also trading companies, government and quasi-
government entities. The associations must also deal with many other
vagaries unique to international trade, such as exchange rate fluctuations
13, ComMIssioN REPORT, supra note 16, at 302, 897 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA)
(Special Supp.) at 88.
36 Id. at 302, 897 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 89.
13Z. Id.
"u Id. at 304, 897 ANTITRusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 89.
,19 ADVISORY PANEL REPORT, supra note 128, at 297.
,' Id. at 297-98.
' Id. at 298.
WEBB-POMERENE
and foreign nontariff trade barriers. Apparently, the collective export ar-
rangements, which greatly assist in meeting these challenges, would not
qualify for exemption according to the Commission's sense of "need." Fi-
nally, whatever rules and regulations promulgated by the antitrust author-
ities to condition the exemption would likely be enormously complex, bur-
densome and restrictive. Such conditions undoubtedly would discourage
exporters from participating in Webb Associations.
Although not mentioned in the report's formal recommendations,
NCRALP suggested placing an additional burden on Webb Associations
by requiring the proposed group to prove that it "would not adversely
affect either the domestic or international trade of the United States.1 4
If adopted by Congress, this alteration also might have the effect of deter-
ring American exporters from utilizing the exemption. Indeed, the Justice
Department already submits that many cooperative export efforts neces-
sarily have some impact on domestic interstate trade143 Thus, it is unlikely
that any proposed association could meet the burden of proving no adverse
domestic or international consequences. Moreover, such an approach fails
to weigh the benefits which an export association may realize with the
domestic antitrust effects. Finally, the real economic costs of shouldering
the burden of proof on this issue may inhibit businesses from attempting
to form Webb Associations.
The United States is committed, in the most profound way, to a whole
set of presumptions regarding the sanctity of the free market system. A
terrible sense of betrayal accompanies any departure from this environ-
ment. The attainment of competitive markets is not simply an objective
this nation believes desirable. Rather, it is central to American social and
political fabric and is linked to the theme that unfettered competition
represents a "charter of economic freedom." This theory regards any aban-
donment of competition as inviting economic regulation, which in turn
leads to undesirable governmental interference with entrepreneurial free-
dom.
Nonetheless, both explicit and implicit competitive sacrifices occasion-
ally are made where a convincing public interest rationale exists. For ex-
ample, the subtle abandonment of market competition may appear
through the loss of small enterprises which cannot absorb the additional
costs of environmental controls. More explicit sacrifices take the form of
specific statutory exemptions or immunities, generally favoring certain
industrial sectors of the economy. In this regard, the Webb-Pomerene ex-
emption is unique. It is not confined to a particular industry, but affects a
cross-section of the manufacturing community which produces goods des-
tined for consumption outside of the United States. Further, unlike many
other exemptions, the Webb-Pomerene Act does not induce government
regulation which controls prices or production. On the contrary, the Act
"' COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 16, at 304, 897 ANTrrrusT & TRADE lRG. REP. (BNA)
(SPECIAL Supp.) AT 89.
"3 See text accompanying notes 82 & 98 supra.
1980]
126 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXVII
encourages enterprises to make independent economic decisions regarding
international sales. Domestic benefits accrue through stimulated produc-
tion, increased employment and profits, and improved international trade
accounts.
Any evaluation of the NCRALP Report probably should consider the
brief timetable and limited resources of the Commission. Nevertheless,
these restrictions alone cannot excuse the report's evident lack of objectiv-
ity. It is regrettable that the NCRALP Report perpetuated many of the
myths which cloak Webb Association activities and failed even to note
many of the current needs for retaining and improving the exemption.
